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118 total field notes available to all members27-Apr-2011 - Nicaragua: Ortega Buying Votes Early
With the Nicaraguan presidential election still several months away, President Daniel Ortega is already getting his party organization into gear. The FSLN organization is going neighborhood to neighborhood and interest group to interest group to buy votes for the coming election.
Neighborhood meetings are being held in which people are told that their barrios will obtain public works projects if Ortega is reelected and their neighborhood votes in favor of the president. They are also told that barrios that vote against the president will not receive basic projects including street repair. The barrio by barrio election results will be watched carefully by Ortega to reward the supporting neighborhoods and punish the opponents.This strategy is creating a dynamic in which people are feeling pressured to vote Sandinista by their neighbors to secure the local projects. As most people already know their neighbors' political leanings, Ortega's strategy is creating some tension in barrios where political divisions could tilt it either way.
Last year, President Ortega promised all government workers an additional 530 cordoba (approximately US$25) bonus every month of this year. Now, the National Workers Front (FNT), which represents government workers, has told its members that they will continue receiving the bonus only if Ortega is elected. The US$40 million in money for that bonus is provided through ALBA, not through the government budget process, and it is certain that Venezuelan President Chavez would cut off that money should Ortega not be reelected.
Government workers are already forced to participate in rallies and marches and union leaders have announced their support for Ortega. By offering them this monthly bonus for Ortega's reelection, the president is buying votes and hedging against those workers privately opposing him when they mark their ballots. First lady Rosario Murillo is leading this effort and will be holding a rally with government workers to praise the benefits of the "solidarity bonus" as the Sandinistas call it.
07-Mar-2011 - Venezuela: Venezuelan fuel sales undermine U.S. sanctionsNeighborhood meetings are being held in which people are told that their barrios will obtain public works projects if Ortega is reelected and their neighborhood votes in favor of the president. They are also told that barrios that vote against the president will not receive basic projects including street repair. The barrio by barrio election results will be watched carefully by Ortega to reward the supporting neighborhoods and punish the opponents.This strategy is creating a dynamic in which people are feeling pressured to vote Sandinista by their neighbors to secure the local projects. As most people already know their neighbors' political leanings, Ortega's strategy is creating some tension in barrios where political divisions could tilt it either way.
Last year, President Ortega promised all government workers an additional 530 cordoba (approximately US$25) bonus every month of this year. Now, the National Workers Front (FNT), which represents government workers, has told its members that they will continue receiving the bonus only if Ortega is elected. The US$40 million in money for that bonus is provided through ALBA, not through the government budget process, and it is certain that Venezuelan President Chavez would cut off that money should Ortega not be reelected.
Government workers are already forced to participate in rallies and marches and union leaders have announced their support for Ortega. By offering them this monthly bonus for Ortega's reelection, the president is buying votes and hedging against those workers privately opposing him when they mark their ballots. First lady Rosario Murillo is leading this effort and will be holding a rally with government workers to praise the benefits of the "solidarity bonus" as the Sandinistas call it.
Last year, the U.S. bolstered its sanctions on Iran to pressure the Middle Eastern country to be more candid about its nuclear program. According to the Iran Sanctions Act, multiple sanctions will be imposed on any entity that sells or provides Iran with refined petroleum products with fair market value of $1 million or more, or with aggregate fair market value of $5 million or more in a twelve-month period. Venezuela’s state-owned petroleum company, PDVSA, may be the next company to be sanctioned under this act if it turns out the rumors that PDVSA sent two cargoes of gasoline to Iran last month are true.
Sources close to the matter recently revealed PDVSA documents that confirmed the shipment of fuel to Iran in February 2011. The vessel carrying the fuel arrived on 27 February in Jebel Ali, Dubai, which is a quick trip across the Persian Gulf to Iranian ports.
PDVSA President Rafael Ramirez denies accusations that the company sent fuel to Iran, but three trade sources confirmed the plan for shipment to wire reporters.
Iran is dependent on fuel due to its limited refining capacity, and has felt the impact that U.S. sanctions were meant to deliver. Prior to the sanctions, the Islamic Republic imported ten to twelve cargoes per month, but since the middle of 2010 major oil companies terminated their business with the nation.
Iran does not import all of its fuel from companies like PDVSA that have decided to ignore international sanctions. One trade source shared with wire services that Iran has stockpiles of fuel and has boosted its own production through petrochemical plants, but “still they are short of gasoline,” reports claim. Around this time of year it is typical for Iran’s gasoline needs to grow, and PDVSA seems to be the entity, illegally, picking up the slack between Iranian needs and international reluctance.
04-Mar-2011 - Guatemala: State of siege requested for Petén departmentSources close to the matter recently revealed PDVSA documents that confirmed the shipment of fuel to Iran in February 2011. The vessel carrying the fuel arrived on 27 February in Jebel Ali, Dubai, which is a quick trip across the Persian Gulf to Iranian ports.
PDVSA President Rafael Ramirez denies accusations that the company sent fuel to Iran, but three trade sources confirmed the plan for shipment to wire reporters.
Iran is dependent on fuel due to its limited refining capacity, and has felt the impact that U.S. sanctions were meant to deliver. Prior to the sanctions, the Islamic Republic imported ten to twelve cargoes per month, but since the middle of 2010 major oil companies terminated their business with the nation.
Iran does not import all of its fuel from companies like PDVSA that have decided to ignore international sanctions. One trade source shared with wire services that Iran has stockpiles of fuel and has boosted its own production through petrochemical plants, but “still they are short of gasoline,” reports claim. Around this time of year it is typical for Iran’s gasoline needs to grow, and PDVSA seems to be the entity, illegally, picking up the slack between Iranian needs and international reluctance.
On 16 February 2011, Petén Governor Rudel Álvarez announced that he had formally asked Guatemalan President Alvaro Colom to declare a ‘state of siege’ in the department, at the request of 13 departmental mayors. The announcement was made just days before the state of siege in the neighboring department of Alta Verapaz expired, but Colom and Interior Minister Carlos Menocal made it clear that the federal government has no plans to redeploy military forces. While Petén is facing an escalating threat from drug gangs, particularly Los Zetas, a Mexican criminal organization, a lack of resources prevents the government from going on the offensive there.
Petén’s location in the far north-east of Guatemala left it on the periphery of historical drug transport routes through the country, which ran from Izabal on the Caribbean coast through Alta Verapaz and Baja Verapaz before crossing into Mexico via Quiché or Huehuetenango. Despite not being located along the primary drug routes, Petén’s vast territory and extended border with Mexico made it a target for recent Los Zetas expansion.
As Guatemala’s largest department, Petén has an area of almost 36,000 square kilometers, covered with dense jungle and sparsely populated with a density of approximately 11 people per square kilometer, according to 2004 census statistics. Petén also contains approximately 600 kilometers of Guatemala’s 871-kilometer border with Mexico. While there are only five legal border crossings, drug traffickers have created their own breach points, through which they freely move large quantities of drugs strapped to the roofs of SUVs. Los Zetas also reportedly control the Usumacinta River, which forms most of Petén’s western border with Mexico.
In addition to creating their own border crossings, Los Zetas have also established direct sourcing by flying cocaine from the Andes to Petén. Guatemalan authorities reported in November 2010 that they detected hundreds of hidden airstrips throughout Petén, located on ‘narco-farms’ appropriated by Los Zetas. Large numbers of heavily armed cartel gunmen reportedly move freely around the department, pressuring local farmers into selling their land with violent threats. The Guatemalan Army has over 2,000 troops patrolling Petén, but Álvarez said the government has only recovered control of 118 thousand hectares in the Maya Biosphere Reserve, 22 percent of the total area.
Violence is concentrated in San Benito and Santa Elena in central Petén, but the root of the department’s problem is the vast territory in which Los Zetas operate freely. The apparent impunity under which Los Zetas operate prompted departmental leaders to request a state of siege. A ‘state of siege,’ or ‘state of exception,’ suspends many constitutional rights, including freedom of movement and to organize, and allows military and police officers to conduct searches or arrest suspects without warrants.
In Alta Verapaz, the declaration of a state of siege on 19 December 2010 accompanied the deployment of 300 specially trained army troops and removal of 325 National Civil Police (PNC) officers to be investigated for corruption. At a meeting with civil society and political leaders on 19 January 2011 in Cobán, the capital of Alta Verapaz, Colom highlighted the achievements made during the two months Alta Verapaz was under a state of siege. The crime rate decreased an average of 57 percent throughout the department, and authorities seized 200 rifles, five airplanes, 28 vehicles, and an undisclosed amount of cash, which some reports put as high as US$65 million. Operations led to the arrest of 300 suspected criminals, including 20 alleged members of Los Zetas.
Military and police operations concentrated on Cobán, where Los Zetas based their activity and reportedly walked the streets carrying assault rifles. The government anticipates that maintaining the modest deployment of forces will maintain security in Coban, under the direction of the country’s third Comisario Modelo funded with US$6 million from the U.S. government.
Guatemalan politicians questioned Colom’s decision to limit the state of siege to Alta Verapaz, given the extent of Los Zetas’ operations in Petén. Since he announced the start of operations in Alta Verapaz, Colom emphasized that the government does not have the resources to expand the state of siege outside of the department. Retaking the vast swathes of jungle under control of Los Zetas will require the dedication of significant resources the federal government is currently incapable of providing.
18-Feb-2011 - Bolivia: Morales' sudden crisisPetén’s location in the far north-east of Guatemala left it on the periphery of historical drug transport routes through the country, which ran from Izabal on the Caribbean coast through Alta Verapaz and Baja Verapaz before crossing into Mexico via Quiché or Huehuetenango. Despite not being located along the primary drug routes, Petén’s vast territory and extended border with Mexico made it a target for recent Los Zetas expansion.
As Guatemala’s largest department, Petén has an area of almost 36,000 square kilometers, covered with dense jungle and sparsely populated with a density of approximately 11 people per square kilometer, according to 2004 census statistics. Petén also contains approximately 600 kilometers of Guatemala’s 871-kilometer border with Mexico. While there are only five legal border crossings, drug traffickers have created their own breach points, through which they freely move large quantities of drugs strapped to the roofs of SUVs. Los Zetas also reportedly control the Usumacinta River, which forms most of Petén’s western border with Mexico.
In addition to creating their own border crossings, Los Zetas have also established direct sourcing by flying cocaine from the Andes to Petén. Guatemalan authorities reported in November 2010 that they detected hundreds of hidden airstrips throughout Petén, located on ‘narco-farms’ appropriated by Los Zetas. Large numbers of heavily armed cartel gunmen reportedly move freely around the department, pressuring local farmers into selling their land with violent threats. The Guatemalan Army has over 2,000 troops patrolling Petén, but Álvarez said the government has only recovered control of 118 thousand hectares in the Maya Biosphere Reserve, 22 percent of the total area.
Violence is concentrated in San Benito and Santa Elena in central Petén, but the root of the department’s problem is the vast territory in which Los Zetas operate freely. The apparent impunity under which Los Zetas operate prompted departmental leaders to request a state of siege. A ‘state of siege,’ or ‘state of exception,’ suspends many constitutional rights, including freedom of movement and to organize, and allows military and police officers to conduct searches or arrest suspects without warrants.
In Alta Verapaz, the declaration of a state of siege on 19 December 2010 accompanied the deployment of 300 specially trained army troops and removal of 325 National Civil Police (PNC) officers to be investigated for corruption. At a meeting with civil society and political leaders on 19 January 2011 in Cobán, the capital of Alta Verapaz, Colom highlighted the achievements made during the two months Alta Verapaz was under a state of siege. The crime rate decreased an average of 57 percent throughout the department, and authorities seized 200 rifles, five airplanes, 28 vehicles, and an undisclosed amount of cash, which some reports put as high as US$65 million. Operations led to the arrest of 300 suspected criminals, including 20 alleged members of Los Zetas.
Military and police operations concentrated on Cobán, where Los Zetas based their activity and reportedly walked the streets carrying assault rifles. The government anticipates that maintaining the modest deployment of forces will maintain security in Coban, under the direction of the country’s third Comisario Modelo funded with US$6 million from the U.S. government.
Guatemalan politicians questioned Colom’s decision to limit the state of siege to Alta Verapaz, given the extent of Los Zetas’ operations in Petén. Since he announced the start of operations in Alta Verapaz, Colom emphasized that the government does not have the resources to expand the state of siege outside of the department. Retaking the vast swathes of jungle under control of Los Zetas will require the dedication of significant resources the federal government is currently incapable of providing.
Bolivian President Evo Morales spent the first five years of his administration with significant public support. While the opposition presented a regular political challenge, the president's popular majority appeared solid and allowed him to govern with a mandate.
In recent weeks, Morales's support has appeared to drop precipitously and sectors that used to support the president have become critical.
The tipping point appears to have been the gasolinazo. With Morales out of the country in late December, Vice President Garcia Linera suddenly announced the end of gasoline subsidies. The government claimed that smugglers and the rich were the big beneficiaries of these subsidies. However, many lower class transportation groups protested as did the lower class who used buses and taxis that would feel the price increase. Several industries including some bread makers announced they would have to raise prices as a result of the lost subsidies.
The protests were significant across the country, but the blockading of roads in El Alto, the poor region around La Paz, was the key indicator that this was a serious problem for the government. Morales once enjoyed a 90% approval rating in El Alto and the region was a key source for protesters who led to the downfall of the previous Sanchez de Lozada and Mesa governments.
The president attempted to calm the protests by implementing some price controls and providing a raise to the military, police, teachers and health workers, but that did little to help the situation. In the middle of everything, rumors of a bank run, which turned out to be false, caused some brief panic in Bolivia's financial markets.
As a result of the protests, the Morales government was forced to back down on the gasolinazo, though they stress they will need to eliminate the subsidies at some point soon.
Within weeks of the fuel protests, a new round of protests have begun in Bolivia, this time over food. The president was forced to flee one planned speech in Oruro due to food protests being too aggressive. Various protests over food prices continue and the government is now considering its options to stockpile food and prevent prices from going to high.
The most recent reliable polls show Morales's approval in the mid-30's, easily the lowest point of his term. That's a significant drop from last November when his approval was around 50%.
18-Feb-2011 - Bolivia: Protests against food prices and gasoline continueIn recent weeks, Morales's support has appeared to drop precipitously and sectors that used to support the president have become critical.
The tipping point appears to have been the gasolinazo. With Morales out of the country in late December, Vice President Garcia Linera suddenly announced the end of gasoline subsidies. The government claimed that smugglers and the rich were the big beneficiaries of these subsidies. However, many lower class transportation groups protested as did the lower class who used buses and taxis that would feel the price increase. Several industries including some bread makers announced they would have to raise prices as a result of the lost subsidies.
The protests were significant across the country, but the blockading of roads in El Alto, the poor region around La Paz, was the key indicator that this was a serious problem for the government. Morales once enjoyed a 90% approval rating in El Alto and the region was a key source for protesters who led to the downfall of the previous Sanchez de Lozada and Mesa governments.
The president attempted to calm the protests by implementing some price controls and providing a raise to the military, police, teachers and health workers, but that did little to help the situation. In the middle of everything, rumors of a bank run, which turned out to be false, caused some brief panic in Bolivia's financial markets.
As a result of the protests, the Morales government was forced to back down on the gasolinazo, though they stress they will need to eliminate the subsidies at some point soon.
Within weeks of the fuel protests, a new round of protests have begun in Bolivia, this time over food. The president was forced to flee one planned speech in Oruro due to food protests being too aggressive. Various protests over food prices continue and the government is now considering its options to stockpile food and prevent prices from going to high.
The most recent reliable polls show Morales's approval in the mid-30's, easily the lowest point of his term. That's a significant drop from last November when his approval was around 50%.
On 10 February 2011, in a small, mining city of Oruro in western Bolivia, President Morales arrived to his hometown to address a parade commemorating a colonial-era uprising. The parade quickly changed its trajectory when miners set off dynamite and the local public protested the rising food prices and shortages, forcing President Evo Morales to flee for safety, and return to the capital city of La Paz. Also in danger were Vice President Alvaro García Linera, and governor of Oruro, Santos Tito. Citizens of the city of Oruro seem to have taken a different view of the President since his reelection in 2009 when the city voted Morales into presidency with 78 percent of the vote.
Similar, smaller protests occurred on the same day in the eastern city of Santa Cruz, La Paz and Cochabamba as the public grows more frustrated with the rising food and transport costs and a shortage of sugar. In December 2010, Morales lifted subsidies on gasoline, flour and sugar declaring that the US$ 380 million state subsidy could no longer be afforded since much of it ends up being smuggled out of the country. Since then, the administration went back on the plan, except for sugar costs which remain unsubsidized by the government. The price of sugar almost doubled in the last two months, and the administration is facing discontent throughout the country, as a result.
Spokesperson for the President, Ivan Canelas, said that President Morales decided to suspend his participation in the parade in order to “not respond to the shameful organized demonstration by displaced social leaders.” He added that, “It is shameful that when initiating a civil march, groups of absent-minded leaders, with past connections to coups d’etat, have protests with dynamite explosives and rockets in order to provoke fear among the population.”
Some protesters focused on demanding the government remove Emapa, a government agency meant to promote food production. Protesters argued the agency does little to help the nation, is inefficient and discourages private commerce. There are no signs, however, that the Morales Administration is making moves to fulfill this request.
More recently, on 15 February 2011, townspeople in Cochabamba, Oruro and Potosí blocked roads, participated in marches and protests, civil strikes and attempts to clash with public transportation in a response to the tariff on transportation. The block provoked the closing of streets connecting Cochabamba with Oruro, Potosí and La Paz. In Santa Cruz, public transportation workers are protesting for a second day in the center of the city.
The Federation of Joined Neighbors also organized a protest on 15 February 2011 that caused chaos in the center of the capital city of La Paz. Protesters yelled for “fair prices” and called out “Evo, Álvaro, the city is hungry!” directing their calls to the President and Vice President. The protesters planned to arrive to the Plaza Murillo to protest in front of the Presidential Palace and Parliament, but police cordons stopped them. The leader of the Federation of Joined Neighbors explained that they are not trying to destabilize the administration; rather, they just want a change to the current minister of Productive Development.
24-Jan-2011 - Venezuela: Chavez, EnabledSimilar, smaller protests occurred on the same day in the eastern city of Santa Cruz, La Paz and Cochabamba as the public grows more frustrated with the rising food and transport costs and a shortage of sugar. In December 2010, Morales lifted subsidies on gasoline, flour and sugar declaring that the US$ 380 million state subsidy could no longer be afforded since much of it ends up being smuggled out of the country. Since then, the administration went back on the plan, except for sugar costs which remain unsubsidized by the government. The price of sugar almost doubled in the last two months, and the administration is facing discontent throughout the country, as a result.
Spokesperson for the President, Ivan Canelas, said that President Morales decided to suspend his participation in the parade in order to “not respond to the shameful organized demonstration by displaced social leaders.” He added that, “It is shameful that when initiating a civil march, groups of absent-minded leaders, with past connections to coups d’etat, have protests with dynamite explosives and rockets in order to provoke fear among the population.”
Some protesters focused on demanding the government remove Emapa, a government agency meant to promote food production. Protesters argued the agency does little to help the nation, is inefficient and discourages private commerce. There are no signs, however, that the Morales Administration is making moves to fulfill this request.
More recently, on 15 February 2011, townspeople in Cochabamba, Oruro and Potosí blocked roads, participated in marches and protests, civil strikes and attempts to clash with public transportation in a response to the tariff on transportation. The block provoked the closing of streets connecting Cochabamba with Oruro, Potosí and La Paz. In Santa Cruz, public transportation workers are protesting for a second day in the center of the city.
The Federation of Joined Neighbors also organized a protest on 15 February 2011 that caused chaos in the center of the capital city of La Paz. Protesters yelled for “fair prices” and called out “Evo, Álvaro, the city is hungry!” directing their calls to the President and Vice President. The protesters planned to arrive to the Plaza Murillo to protest in front of the Presidential Palace and Parliament, but police cordons stopped them. The leader of the Federation of Joined Neighbors explained that they are not trying to destabilize the administration; rather, they just want a change to the current minister of Productive Development.
Venezuelan politics took an interesting turn of events in December 2010 when the lame-duck National Assembly granted President Hugo Chávez the power to legislate for up to one year under the Enabling Act. The new legislation gives Chávez the power to issue decrees and laws related to the emergencies of the rainy seasons, which includes housing and transportation areas, as well. This change marks the fourth time in Chávez’s twelve-year presidency that he assumed the power to rule by decree.
Chávez’s new power permits the president to arbitrarily create law without approval by the National Assembly. Critics believed the decree power was Chávez’s way of undercutting the incoming National Assembly, which is made up of a number of opposition lawmakers.
The opposition parties gained 67 of parliament’s 165 seats in the September 2010 elections, leaving Chávez without the two-thirds majority he needs to approve major laws and appoint Supreme Court justices. The 67 seats are a signifncant increase in representation for opposition parties that have had almost no representation since their 2005 decision to boycott elections.
Harsh criticism over the decree from home and abroad brought Chávez to parliament on 15 January 2011 to announce that he is prepared to give up this power as early as May 2011, almost a year shorter than the mid-2012 expiration of the legislation, pending the progress of post-flood emergency measures. To further belittle the accusations, Chávez welcomed the opposition parties to the National Assembly and called for mutual respect in a seven-hour speech. Yet, many in the opposition did not fall for what they perceived as a phony call for collaboration.
“We have a president who spends 365 days a year lashing out at the media, the church, NGOs, fighting with everyone and then he tells us one day that he wants dialogue,” said Julio Borges, an opposition lawmaker who sat through the president’s typically long state-of-the-nation speech.
The National Assembly got off to an intense start in 2011. Loud applause, shouts and slogan chants were heard at the start of the National Assembly’s new session on 5 January 2011. “They will not return!” chanted Pro-Chávez lawmakers, while opponents replied they had returned. Outside of the National Assembly, protestors of both sides demonstrated and National Guard troops lined the streets to deter any riots.
The opposition’s significant representation in parliament brings the political tension to new heights in Caracas. An opposition lawmaker recently launched a challenge to the president and his historically "rubber stamp" legislature. Venezuelan political party Por la Democracia Social (Podemos) Deputy Juan José Molina announced that his party will file complaints to the Organization of American States and Mercosur about the law-making process, as well as file an appeal with the Venezuelan Supreme Court, claiming 80 percent of the laws approved by the National Assembly did not correspond with the regulations of the Venezuelan Constitution.
Within the first week of the new session, the opposition denounced the previous National Assembly’s law that permits Chávez to rule by decree, claiming it violates the Inter-American Democratic Charter of the Organization of American States. Additionally, the opposition is arguing that President Chávez plans to use his new powers to advance his campaign for a third presidential term in 2012.
10-Jan-2011 - Venezuela: Venezuela's Dance with TerrorismChávez’s new power permits the president to arbitrarily create law without approval by the National Assembly. Critics believed the decree power was Chávez’s way of undercutting the incoming National Assembly, which is made up of a number of opposition lawmakers.
The opposition parties gained 67 of parliament’s 165 seats in the September 2010 elections, leaving Chávez without the two-thirds majority he needs to approve major laws and appoint Supreme Court justices. The 67 seats are a signifncant increase in representation for opposition parties that have had almost no representation since their 2005 decision to boycott elections.
Harsh criticism over the decree from home and abroad brought Chávez to parliament on 15 January 2011 to announce that he is prepared to give up this power as early as May 2011, almost a year shorter than the mid-2012 expiration of the legislation, pending the progress of post-flood emergency measures. To further belittle the accusations, Chávez welcomed the opposition parties to the National Assembly and called for mutual respect in a seven-hour speech. Yet, many in the opposition did not fall for what they perceived as a phony call for collaboration.
“We have a president who spends 365 days a year lashing out at the media, the church, NGOs, fighting with everyone and then he tells us one day that he wants dialogue,” said Julio Borges, an opposition lawmaker who sat through the president’s typically long state-of-the-nation speech.
The National Assembly got off to an intense start in 2011. Loud applause, shouts and slogan chants were heard at the start of the National Assembly’s new session on 5 January 2011. “They will not return!” chanted Pro-Chávez lawmakers, while opponents replied they had returned. Outside of the National Assembly, protestors of both sides demonstrated and National Guard troops lined the streets to deter any riots.
The opposition’s significant representation in parliament brings the political tension to new heights in Caracas. An opposition lawmaker recently launched a challenge to the president and his historically "rubber stamp" legislature. Venezuelan political party Por la Democracia Social (Podemos) Deputy Juan José Molina announced that his party will file complaints to the Organization of American States and Mercosur about the law-making process, as well as file an appeal with the Venezuelan Supreme Court, claiming 80 percent of the laws approved by the National Assembly did not correspond with the regulations of the Venezuelan Constitution.
Within the first week of the new session, the opposition denounced the previous National Assembly’s law that permits Chávez to rule by decree, claiming it violates the Inter-American Democratic Charter of the Organization of American States. Additionally, the opposition is arguing that President Chávez plans to use his new powers to advance his campaign for a third presidential term in 2012.
On 9 December 2010, United States House Representative (R-Fort Meyers) Connie Mack, the Ranking Republican of the House Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, wrote a letter calling for the US government to designate Venezuela as a state sponsor of terrorism. Mack wrote the letter following the publication of an article in the German daily, Die Welt. In the 25 November 2010 edition, the publication reported that Venezuela and Iran signed an agreement on 19 October 2010, allowing Iran to establish a military base operated by Iranian Revolutionary guard soldiers, Iran missile officers and Venezuelan missile officers.
According to the agreement, Iran allegedly permitted the Venezuelan government to launch the missiles in “emergency” cases and stated that Venezuelan officers could use the base's facilities for “national needs.” Die Welt also reported that the Iran Shabab 3, Scud-B and Scud-C missiles would be deployed in the military base.
“What further proof does this Administration need that Venezuelan leader Hugo Chávez is a dangerous threat to the freedom, stability and security of the entire hemisphere?” Mack wrote, citing four reasons: Chávez's aid and support of the FARC, Venezuela's collaboration with Iran in the oil and bank sectors, the Chávez administration's human rights violations and the military base agreement.
Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez has been candid about his ideological support of the FARC. In January 2008, Chávez spoke to the National Assembly about Colombia, asserting that everyone present was Colombian, of “the Bolivarian Colombia.” The president spoke about achieving peace throughout Latin America, maintaining that the FARC and ELN were not terrorists, but armies working towards national liberation. “They are insurgents that have a political agenda...that have a Bolivarian agenda...” he persisted.
In 2010, Spanish Judge Eloy Velsaco opened an investigation to determine the links between the FARC, ETA and the Venezuelan government. Chávez deemed his probing “crazy,” claiming that there was no substance to the accusations. Velasco's investigation specifically targeted Arturo Cubillas Fontán, who allegedly trained ETA forces in Venezuela and collaborated with FARC rebels.
Cubillas was the director in of the Venezuelan Ministry of Agriculture and Lands' Administration and Service Office. The Spanish government has unsuccessfully applied for Cubillas' extradition. Venezuelan authorities protested that they could not grant the request because Cubillas became a Venezuelan citizen by marriage. The Venezuelan government officially launched an independent investigation into Cubillas' activities at the end of October 2010.
Some foreign affairs experts and politicians alleged that the Chávez administration provided some form of support to the FARC in Colombia for the past several years. Several newspapers have made claims about Chávez providing financial support and harboring narco-traffickers collaborating with the FARC and other organizations.
US and Colombian officials alleged that Venezuelan officials are turning a blind eye to FARC guerrillas trafficking drugs along the Venezuelan border, which ultimately provides the group with funding for living costs, weapons and other supplies.
In 2008, Colombian officials claimed that they discovered evidence linking Venezuelan authorities to the guerrilla group. After FARC second-in-command Raul Reyes died as a result of a raid in March 2008, Colombian soldiers recovered Reyes' laptop computer, which contained files implicating high-ranking Venezuelans working with the FARC to supply weapons, ammunition and US$300 million.
Colombian General Oscar Naranjo reported that one of Reyes' notes stated that Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez was “grateful” for US$150,000 which he received while he was in prison in the early 1990s. Another note referred to Venezuelan intelligence agents providing the FARC with weapons. The Colombian government sent the documents to Venezuela and Ecuador. Interpol analyzed the documents and concluded that the Colombian officials took the files directly from Reyes' computer and did not distort or re-write any of the information, although the Ecuadoran government continued to dispute the legitimacy of the documents.
Representative Mack additionally pointed out that the Chávez administration collaborated with Iran in the financial and gas sector. The Export Development Bank of Iran (EDBI) created a Venezuelan subsidiary, Banco Internacional de Desarrollo C.A. (BID) in Caracas, which began operation on 2 January 2008.
Both governments also announced the creation of a joint bank in May 2008. In April 2009, President Chávez and Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad inaugurated the Iran-Venezuela Joint Bank in Tehran. With an initial capital base of US$200 million, the bank supports joint economic, industrial and mining development projects.
Both countries have also created joint ventures and invested money into gas exploration projects. In October 2007, Iran and Venezuela announced the formation of a US$1 billion joint venture to explore gas in countries such as Bolivia. They created the Venezuelan-Iranian Oil and Gas Company (VENIROGC) as a 50-50 partnership between Petroleos de Venezuela SA (PdvSA) and Petropars. The company currently has an office located in Spain.
Venezuela has also invested millions of dollars in exploration projects. At the end of October 2010, an Iranian official announced that PdvSA will invest US$780 million towards projects in Iran's South Pars gas field.
The Clinton administration and the second Bush administration labeled Iran as the largest state-sponsor of terrorism. US government officials may consider numerous complaints about the Venezuelan government's human rights record, its rhetorical support of the FARC as well as its diplomatic and economic relationship with Iran in order to label Venezuela a state sponsor of terrorism.
However, Die Welt has been the only source that released information regarding the Venezuela-Iran military base and missile agreement. Experts and journalists writing about the issue have solely based their articles on the German publication's story. Currently, there is a lack of significant proof in the open source space about the agreement.
29-Dec-2010 - Honduras: Mystery Shrouds Journalist MurdersAccording to the agreement, Iran allegedly permitted the Venezuelan government to launch the missiles in “emergency” cases and stated that Venezuelan officers could use the base's facilities for “national needs.” Die Welt also reported that the Iran Shabab 3, Scud-B and Scud-C missiles would be deployed in the military base.
“What further proof does this Administration need that Venezuelan leader Hugo Chávez is a dangerous threat to the freedom, stability and security of the entire hemisphere?” Mack wrote, citing four reasons: Chávez's aid and support of the FARC, Venezuela's collaboration with Iran in the oil and bank sectors, the Chávez administration's human rights violations and the military base agreement.
Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez has been candid about his ideological support of the FARC. In January 2008, Chávez spoke to the National Assembly about Colombia, asserting that everyone present was Colombian, of “the Bolivarian Colombia.” The president spoke about achieving peace throughout Latin America, maintaining that the FARC and ELN were not terrorists, but armies working towards national liberation. “They are insurgents that have a political agenda...that have a Bolivarian agenda...” he persisted.
In 2010, Spanish Judge Eloy Velsaco opened an investigation to determine the links between the FARC, ETA and the Venezuelan government. Chávez deemed his probing “crazy,” claiming that there was no substance to the accusations. Velasco's investigation specifically targeted Arturo Cubillas Fontán, who allegedly trained ETA forces in Venezuela and collaborated with FARC rebels.
Cubillas was the director in of the Venezuelan Ministry of Agriculture and Lands' Administration and Service Office. The Spanish government has unsuccessfully applied for Cubillas' extradition. Venezuelan authorities protested that they could not grant the request because Cubillas became a Venezuelan citizen by marriage. The Venezuelan government officially launched an independent investigation into Cubillas' activities at the end of October 2010.
Some foreign affairs experts and politicians alleged that the Chávez administration provided some form of support to the FARC in Colombia for the past several years. Several newspapers have made claims about Chávez providing financial support and harboring narco-traffickers collaborating with the FARC and other organizations.
US and Colombian officials alleged that Venezuelan officials are turning a blind eye to FARC guerrillas trafficking drugs along the Venezuelan border, which ultimately provides the group with funding for living costs, weapons and other supplies.
In 2008, Colombian officials claimed that they discovered evidence linking Venezuelan authorities to the guerrilla group. After FARC second-in-command Raul Reyes died as a result of a raid in March 2008, Colombian soldiers recovered Reyes' laptop computer, which contained files implicating high-ranking Venezuelans working with the FARC to supply weapons, ammunition and US$300 million.
Colombian General Oscar Naranjo reported that one of Reyes' notes stated that Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez was “grateful” for US$150,000 which he received while he was in prison in the early 1990s. Another note referred to Venezuelan intelligence agents providing the FARC with weapons. The Colombian government sent the documents to Venezuela and Ecuador. Interpol analyzed the documents and concluded that the Colombian officials took the files directly from Reyes' computer and did not distort or re-write any of the information, although the Ecuadoran government continued to dispute the legitimacy of the documents.
Representative Mack additionally pointed out that the Chávez administration collaborated with Iran in the financial and gas sector. The Export Development Bank of Iran (EDBI) created a Venezuelan subsidiary, Banco Internacional de Desarrollo C.A. (BID) in Caracas, which began operation on 2 January 2008.
Both governments also announced the creation of a joint bank in May 2008. In April 2009, President Chávez and Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad inaugurated the Iran-Venezuela Joint Bank in Tehran. With an initial capital base of US$200 million, the bank supports joint economic, industrial and mining development projects.
Both countries have also created joint ventures and invested money into gas exploration projects. In October 2007, Iran and Venezuela announced the formation of a US$1 billion joint venture to explore gas in countries such as Bolivia. They created the Venezuelan-Iranian Oil and Gas Company (VENIROGC) as a 50-50 partnership between Petroleos de Venezuela SA (PdvSA) and Petropars. The company currently has an office located in Spain.
Venezuela has also invested millions of dollars in exploration projects. At the end of October 2010, an Iranian official announced that PdvSA will invest US$780 million towards projects in Iran's South Pars gas field.
The Clinton administration and the second Bush administration labeled Iran as the largest state-sponsor of terrorism. US government officials may consider numerous complaints about the Venezuelan government's human rights record, its rhetorical support of the FARC as well as its diplomatic and economic relationship with Iran in order to label Venezuela a state sponsor of terrorism.
However, Die Welt has been the only source that released information regarding the Venezuela-Iran military base and missile agreement. Experts and journalists writing about the issue have solely based their articles on the German publication's story. Currently, there is a lack of significant proof in the open source space about the agreement.
On 28 December 2010, the tenth Honduran journalist this year was assassinated by unknown gunshots as he left his home in La Ceiba in the department of Atlántida. The journalist Henry Sauzo was a correspondent of HRN radio in Tegucigalpa. His murder remains unsolved.
Honduras is considered one of the most dangerous places for journalists in Latin America and even in the world. Almost a year after President Profirio Lobo took office there are few signs of improvement in the security of journalists. In fact, the threats and attacks against journalists continue to be one of the country’s top security issues. Honduras places 143 out of 178 countries in the 2010 Press Freedom Index Rankings, dropping from 87 in 2007.
Following the tenth murder of a journalist in Honduras this past December, international human rights agencies and organizations for the defense of freedom of the press demanded answers to the dangerous conditions for journalists in the country. In response, President Lobo requested help from the United States and other allied countries in the investigation of crimes against journalists. Currently, only three of the ten assassinations this year are confirmed as being directly related to the practice of journalism.
President Porfirio Lobo blames journalist assassinations on “criminal violence” in the country. However, an international report completed on October 2010 by the International Media Support group, the World Association of Community Radios in Latin American and the Caribbean (AMARC-LAC) and ARTICLE 19, highlights “the systematic failure of the [Honduran] authorities either by inaction or action,” in defending and protecting the freedom of the press in Honduras.
The report finds four root causes of impunity regarding attacks against freedom of expression, including inconsistent and botched investigations into murders, failure of the state to address cases of journalists at risk, failure of the state to implement precautionary measures to Inter-American Commission on Human Rights-designated radio stations, and limitations of the existing legal framework in the protection of telecommunications and broadcasting institutions.
The findings of the report were expressed at the 140th session of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights that took place in December 2010. Representatives of Honduras were present at the session and denied many of the findings, although failed to offer evidence to support the denial.
In 2007, gunmen murdered a journalist famed for criticizing President Zelaya, leading the United Nations and the Inter-American Press Association to warn of dangers to journalists in Honduras. During the Zelaya Presidency, most journalists killed shared in common a tendency of speaking out against the president. A year after Zelaya’s exile to the Dominican Republic, threats to journalists remain.
28-Dec-2010 - Venezuela: Could Mexican cartels acquire Russian missiles from Venezuela?Honduras is considered one of the most dangerous places for journalists in Latin America and even in the world. Almost a year after President Profirio Lobo took office there are few signs of improvement in the security of journalists. In fact, the threats and attacks against journalists continue to be one of the country’s top security issues. Honduras places 143 out of 178 countries in the 2010 Press Freedom Index Rankings, dropping from 87 in 2007.
Following the tenth murder of a journalist in Honduras this past December, international human rights agencies and organizations for the defense of freedom of the press demanded answers to the dangerous conditions for journalists in the country. In response, President Lobo requested help from the United States and other allied countries in the investigation of crimes against journalists. Currently, only three of the ten assassinations this year are confirmed as being directly related to the practice of journalism.
President Porfirio Lobo blames journalist assassinations on “criminal violence” in the country. However, an international report completed on October 2010 by the International Media Support group, the World Association of Community Radios in Latin American and the Caribbean (AMARC-LAC) and ARTICLE 19, highlights “the systematic failure of the [Honduran] authorities either by inaction or action,” in defending and protecting the freedom of the press in Honduras.
The report finds four root causes of impunity regarding attacks against freedom of expression, including inconsistent and botched investigations into murders, failure of the state to address cases of journalists at risk, failure of the state to implement precautionary measures to Inter-American Commission on Human Rights-designated radio stations, and limitations of the existing legal framework in the protection of telecommunications and broadcasting institutions.
The findings of the report were expressed at the 140th session of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights that took place in December 2010. Representatives of Honduras were present at the session and denied many of the findings, although failed to offer evidence to support the denial.
In 2007, gunmen murdered a journalist famed for criticizing President Zelaya, leading the United Nations and the Inter-American Press Association to warn of dangers to journalists in Honduras. During the Zelaya Presidency, most journalists killed shared in common a tendency of speaking out against the president. A year after Zelaya’s exile to the Dominican Republic, threats to journalists remain.
According to a leaked cable from February 2009, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton raised concerns to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow after Russia announced sales of advanced anti-aircraft arms to Venezuela, including the Igla-S (SA-24) MANPADS, which is believed to be Russia’s most advanced and lethal portable air-defense systems. The Igla-S missiles are capable of shooting down aircraft from 19,000 feet. The U.S. Government is particularly concerned about the possibility of Mexican drug cartels acquiring these anti-aircraft missiles through Venezuela.
The leaked cable, sent on 14 February 2009, consisted of U.S. officials asking its embassy to negotiate with Russia for the holding back of the sale of anti-aircraft equipment to Venezuela. The cable cites insufficient arms security in Venezuela and the government’s alleged links to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). FARC is the leftist guerilla group suspected of having ties to various Mexican drug cartels.
“In light of Venezuela’s relationship with the FARC, corruption within the Venezuelan military, and our assessment that Venezuela’s stockpile and security management practices do not meet international standards, we are concerned there is a significant risk that these weapons could be diverted to the FARC,” the cables read.
The cable states the U.S. government’s fears that if these sophisticated systems somehow fell into the hands of the FARC, they could be sold or traded to drug organizations, such as those in Mexico, which are actively seeking to acquire powerful and highly sophisticated weapons for use against government forces.
The cable describes communications from 2005 to 2009 between American and Russian officials about U.S. concerns over the arms deal. Despite four years of U.S. efforts to obstruct the deal, the Russian News & Information Agency Novosti (RIA Novosti) reported on 19 November 2008 that Rosoboronexport—the sole state intermediary agency for Russia’s exports and imports of defense-related and dual use products, technologies and services—signed a major contract to sell Igla-S MANPADS to Venezuela. The manager of LOMO, a partner company in the production of Igla-S, confirmed that the contract would result in the delivery of several hundred Igla-S MANPADS to Venezuela.
U.N. arms control data shows that Russia delivered as many as 1,800 Igla-S anti-aircraft missiles to Venezuela in 2009.
23-Dec-2010 - Mexico: The youth bulge and criminals in JuarezThe leaked cable, sent on 14 February 2009, consisted of U.S. officials asking its embassy to negotiate with Russia for the holding back of the sale of anti-aircraft equipment to Venezuela. The cable cites insufficient arms security in Venezuela and the government’s alleged links to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). FARC is the leftist guerilla group suspected of having ties to various Mexican drug cartels.
“In light of Venezuela’s relationship with the FARC, corruption within the Venezuelan military, and our assessment that Venezuela’s stockpile and security management practices do not meet international standards, we are concerned there is a significant risk that these weapons could be diverted to the FARC,” the cables read.
The cable states the U.S. government’s fears that if these sophisticated systems somehow fell into the hands of the FARC, they could be sold or traded to drug organizations, such as those in Mexico, which are actively seeking to acquire powerful and highly sophisticated weapons for use against government forces.
The cable describes communications from 2005 to 2009 between American and Russian officials about U.S. concerns over the arms deal. Despite four years of U.S. efforts to obstruct the deal, the Russian News & Information Agency Novosti (RIA Novosti) reported on 19 November 2008 that Rosoboronexport—the sole state intermediary agency for Russia’s exports and imports of defense-related and dual use products, technologies and services—signed a major contract to sell Igla-S MANPADS to Venezuela. The manager of LOMO, a partner company in the production of Igla-S, confirmed that the contract would result in the delivery of several hundred Igla-S MANPADS to Venezuela.
U.N. arms control data shows that Russia delivered as many as 1,800 Igla-S anti-aircraft missiles to Venezuela in 2009.
The Secretary of Social Development (SEDESOL) Heriberto Felix Guerra recently stated that as part of the strategy “We are all Juárez: Let’s Rebuild our City” the Mexican government found children as young as 13 years old transforming into criminals and assassins in exchange for US$ 40.
Human settlements are becoming more distant in the city of Juárez, even as far as 14 kilometers from the city. Moreover, while the population in Juárez doubled in the last ten years, it grew nine times its geographic size. As Mexicans begin moving farther outside the city, they face a greater lack of infrastructure in schools and hospitals. Individuals living in these new areas need to travel further and pay the associated costs to get education and healthcare services.
Transportation for a child to go to school from outside of the city costs approximately US$ 3.37 per day. Most families cannot afford this daily cost, so the majority of students do not go to school. In many cases, children stay at home and find other ways to earn money. ‘The ninis,’ children who neither study nor work, arise as a result. These children become easy recruits for organized crime.
According to Heriberto Felix Guerra, the root of this problem lies in the fact that the growth in the outskirts of the city outpaced the development of resources and infrastructure in those places. “It is a factory for creating assassins, that is what it is,” said Raul Ibanez Marquez, Deputy General Director for the office of SEDESOL.
Ciudad Juarez, across the border from El Paso, Texas is the most violent city in Mexico due to the turf battles among several street gangs. The mothers say their houses are ugly, cramped, dirty and poor, with destroyed sidewalks, no public spaces, parks nor gardens. The corners are filled with thugs. The city’s death toll for 2010 recently exceeded 3,000. The fierce fighting and the consequent deaths of thugs and criminals has led to major recruitment efforts to attract young people to the cartels’ ranks.
In an attempt to counteract the children-turned-criminals phenomenon, SEDESOL recently began offering classes to children in community centers in an attempt to keep children off the streets.
Human settlements are becoming more distant in the city of Juárez, even as far as 14 kilometers from the city. Moreover, while the population in Juárez doubled in the last ten years, it grew nine times its geographic size. As Mexicans begin moving farther outside the city, they face a greater lack of infrastructure in schools and hospitals. Individuals living in these new areas need to travel further and pay the associated costs to get education and healthcare services.
Transportation for a child to go to school from outside of the city costs approximately US$ 3.37 per day. Most families cannot afford this daily cost, so the majority of students do not go to school. In many cases, children stay at home and find other ways to earn money. ‘The ninis,’ children who neither study nor work, arise as a result. These children become easy recruits for organized crime.
According to Heriberto Felix Guerra, the root of this problem lies in the fact that the growth in the outskirts of the city outpaced the development of resources and infrastructure in those places. “It is a factory for creating assassins, that is what it is,” said Raul Ibanez Marquez, Deputy General Director for the office of SEDESOL.
Ciudad Juarez, across the border from El Paso, Texas is the most violent city in Mexico due to the turf battles among several street gangs. The mothers say their houses are ugly, cramped, dirty and poor, with destroyed sidewalks, no public spaces, parks nor gardens. The corners are filled with thugs. The city’s death toll for 2010 recently exceeded 3,000. The fierce fighting and the consequent deaths of thugs and criminals has led to major recruitment efforts to attract young people to the cartels’ ranks.
In an attempt to counteract the children-turned-criminals phenomenon, SEDESOL recently began offering classes to children in community centers in an attempt to keep children off the streets.
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