The recent arrest of five Mexican nationals, one Colombian, and one American in Hong Kong has lifted the veil a little more on a growing demand market for cocaine in China and offers another example of deviant globalization.

In total, Hong Kong police seized just over a half ton of cocaine, likely destined to the wholesale cocaine markets in several Chinese cities, where millionaires abound.

The last bust I could find after a quick search occurred in May 2006, when Chinese authorities discovered 300 kilos of cocaine, which had allegedly arrived directly from Colombia.

Since the 1980s, Mexican criminals have slowly captured control over the supply of methamphetamines. Shortly after he escape from prison in 2001, El Chapo likely spurred his men to get deeper into the methamphetamine trade. Soon after, the Sinaloa Federation deepened ties in India, Thailand, and China to source ephedrine, the precursor for meth.

It makes sense that these same pipelines have evolved into two-way channels as business links develop. It wouldn’t surprise me to learn that several cells of Sinaloa Federation operators are at work in China and India to develop cocaine demand markets in two of the world’s fastest growing economies.

It’s becoming harder to argue that Eastern Europe is the emerging market for cocaine. We will see what comes of this case in Hong Kong, due to go to court on 14 November 2011. Deviant globalization suggests that as the licit economy grows, so grows the illicit economy. The EU is mired in economic malaise while China and India continue to flourish. My bet is on Asia becoming the next emerging market for cocaine, if it hasn’t done so already.

September 21, 2011

Zeta training camp captured in northern Nuevo Leon

September 20, 2011

35 alleged Zetas killed, bodies dumped in Veracruz

September 19, 2011

Knights Templar threaten Zetas in Guanajuato

Cartels aligned to combat Los Zetas in Jalisco

Alleged Zeta leader captured, linked to Monterrey casino attack

September 15, 2011

Zetas allegedly behind hanging of two youngsters for their social network activity

For months, I have continued to ask a series of simple questions to contacts around Mexico and the US who I know retain a special interest in Los Zetas. 

The primary question is: "do you think Los Zetas are strategizing to cut the country in half?" This question usually surfaces within a longer conversation about Zeta activity in Mexico and, most recently, in Guatemala, where the organization's effect on society has riveted local and international observers.

The first response to my question about Los Zetas in Mexico, however, is usually physical: a quixotic look, raised eyebrows, a frown. The question is open-ended; as intended, it sparks further discussion, and an informal interview ensues. The resulting information, carefully procured over months of discussion and interaction, has fused together into what is so far a loosely tethered theory I call, simply, The Zeta Cross (see map at bottom of post).

Since what we call in our book the "War in the North" began, Los Zetas have fought for control of Nuevo Laredo. I continue to believe that they, through Miguel Treviño's own special brand of barbarism, hold on to this plaza. 

The next node to the south is Monterrey. As current events unfold, it remains clear that Los Zetas are still fighting for control of the plaza. (I will discuss Monterrey in detail in a separate post.)

If you trace a finger on a map down Mx Federal highway 54, the next major stop along the Zetas Cross is Zacatecas. This is the hub and where the vertical and horizontal lines meet. 

Part of my theory, while focused on strategy, breaks down the management of the organization, as it plays out between El Lazca, considered Los Zetas number one, and Miguel Treviño, considered number two. Many of us agree that Treviño remains focused on the drug trafficking side of the Zetas business enterprise, while El Lazca remains focused on other business streams, especially extortion. I would argue that for the sake of their relationship, the men do communicate, engage in profit sharing like two Sr. partners in a professional services firm, and mostly stay out of one another's business. As such El Lazca, while on the move, has made the state - and city - of Zacatecas an important hub for Los Zetas activity across Mexico, whereas Treviño remains entrenched in Nuevo Laredo.

Recent activity in Zacatecas points to what appears to be a "better late than never" move by rival groups to construct a united front to block Zeta expansion south.

The united front against Los Zetas in Zacatecas looks a lot like what we saw in February 2010, when the Gulf Cartel, elements of the Sinaloa Federation, and the Familia Michoacana - as it was then known - grouped together to force Los Zetas out of Tamaulipas. Their offensive was largely successful, pushing Los Zetas into a tactical retreat, which I believe pulled their front lines back north to Nuevo Laredo and south to Tampico. Since then, Los Zetas have pushed back into Tamaulipas, but have yet to regain position in Matamoros.

In Zacatecas, the same sort of united front has formed, though I'm not sure if it will be as strong or as effective as the first "united cartels" joint venture. The united front in Zacatecas is made up of two splinter groups, still within their own start up phase, and the Gulf Cartel. According to my friends at the Excelsior, La Resistencia, El Cartel Jalisco Nueva Generación, and members of the Gulf Cartel are all pushing back against Los Zetas' expansion south from Zacatecas into Aguascalientes and Jalisco - namely Guadalajara. The line up is interesting: we have three disparate groups formed together under a loose alliance to fight against a single paramilitary organization. Gunmen on both sides are well-armed, poorly trained, and highly motivated by pay, reward of ascension within their organizations, and the promise of loot - the perfect recipe for a blood bath.

For a review of these splinter groups, check out InSight Crime's coverage of the atomization of Jalisco in the wake of Ignacio "Nacho" Coronel's death in mid-2010.

The battle lines in Zacatecas have been drawn and mapped, thanks again to Excelcior:

Now, moving south from Zacatecas, and assuming that Los Zetas have a good chance at breaking through the Resistencia-CJNG-CDG united front, Aguascalientes and Guadalajara are the next two stops on the route south. If Los Zetas capture control of Guadalajara, the hard part is over. It would be a matter of time, I would argue, before the organization forces south to capture the port at Manzanillo in Colima. I cannot overemphasize, however, the difficult task of capturing Guadalajara. Since the days of "El Padrino" who helped El Chapo - apart from the Arellano-Felix brothers and Amado Carrillo-Fuentes - get started, Guadalajara has been tightly held by Sinaloa Federation interests. Any Zeta offensive to take this city will be a long, nasty fight.

So, back to the question: "do you think Los Zetas are strategizing to cut the country in half?"

There is still no clear answer, but if Los Zetas push into Jalisco, it would make sense for them to complete the line by taking a Pacific port and completing the vertical division. A north-south corridor, from Nuevo Laredo to Manzanillo would afford Los Zetas several important elements:

1. A secure connection from a Pacific port to a US border crossing - ideal for drugs trafficking

2. Separate the Knights Templar from the US border and their friends in the Sinaloa Federation

3. Contain the Sinaloa Federation to the north of their line, where the Sierra Madres west of Durango form a natural barrier to keep them on the Pacific coast.

These points are all important, though number three is the most interesting. I believe that Los Zetas are the number two criminal organization in terms of staying power - a summation of their size, revenue generation, territorial control, and several other, minor details about training, force strength, and political penetration.

The number one group undoubtedly remains the Sinaloa Federation, which Los Zetas can only contain, not destroy. The Zetas Cross theory assumes that Los Zetas seeks to contain the Sinaloa Federation, while isolating the Knights Templar and the Gulf Cartel.

The east-west, horizontal line of the Zetas Cross completes that isolation. Stretching from Tampico, Tamaulipas, and passing west through Ciudad Valles, San Luis Potosí (SLP), Zacatecas, and ending in Durango, the horizontal line of the Zetas Cross, if completed, isolates the operational hub of the Gulf Cartel in Matamoros from the rest of the country.

Currently, I would argue that when considering the points along this horizontal line, Los Zetas do not control Durango - traditionally a stronghold of the Sinaloa Federation. Part of the complication with pushing their forces into the city is the ongoing battle for complete control of the Torreón-Gomez Palacio plaza on the Durango-Coahuila border. Los Zetas continue to battle for control of that plaza. If they win that battle, we would almost certainly watch Los Zetas push their influence south into Durango, pressuring El Chapo's people from the north in Coahuila and from the south in Zacatecas.

Today, on 19 September 2011, I would argue that Los Zetas have completed approximately 60 % of this cross, give or take about 10 %. Most of the fighting between Los Zetas and the organization's rivals will undoubtedly be at the Zacatecas-Jalisco border. And if Los Zetas break this alliance, we'll see them push into Guadalajara - though not an operation likely initiated until after the Pan American games. 

The recently announced Zeta alignment with rogue segments of the Milenio Cartel is interesting because it implies, at least, that Los Zetas have lured defectors to their ranks, possibly improving local knowledge, intelligence gathering, and recruiting capabilities from within rival organizations. This alliance, if true, also grants Los Zetas a small beachhead in Guadalajara, from where the group may be able to attack the united cartels from behind the battle lines drawn in southern Zacatecas…

I'll continue to report on The Zetas Cross as events unfold. As I learn more from colleagues on the ground, I'll focus on some of the points along the cross, including: Monterrey (Saltillo), Tampico, Ciudad Valles, SLP, Zacatecas (Fresnillo), Durango, Aguascalientes, Guadalajara, and Manzanillo.

Meanwhile, Guatemala hovers as an item of high interest. Reporting on this blog will ensue as we confirm rumors.

Zetas Cross map legend: 

Yellow is Sinaloa Federation; Green, CDG; Blue, the Knights Templar

As many of you know, I have been working on a book about Los Zetas with Dr. George Grayson. We have finished the draft manuscript of The Executioner's Men, and the book should be on shelves by March 2012, but Los Zetas will undoubtedly continue to evolve and interact with the narco ecosystem, so I'd like to track some of their movements on this blog. 

Maybe I'll have enough material to publish a companion report when the book comes out.

Just before we sent in the final version of the manuscript, we managed to insert the Monterrey casino firebombing, assuming at the time that it was Los Zetas, but we just missed the recent death of Metro 3, who was the Gulf Cartel man in Reynosa who allegedly killed Concord 3 and sparked what we call the "War in the North" between Los Zetas and the Unified Cartels - the Sinaloa Federation, the Gulf Cartel, and the Familia Michoacana.

A year and a half after Concord 3's death, Los Zetas are still fighting the Unified Cartels, though it appears as though the alliance has run out of steam. La Familia Michoacana has devolved into the Knights Templar; the Sinaloa Federation appears to be more interested in protecting turf on the pacific side of the country; and, the Gulf Cartel continues to expand its influence and territory beyond the Frontera Chica area, where it appears to retain some level of control.

Just this morning, I came across some news of a sicario who police captured in Campeche. He claimed to be a Zeta and explained how he had received 15 days of training in the mountains of Veracruz. Judging from his picture on mundonarco, he didn't appear to be in great shape, nor look as though he could have lasted for even half of the reported two-hour morning PT his 30-man cohort endured every morning before beginning their day.

Apart from the unsurprising account of learning how to field strip, clean, and re-assemble AR-15 and AK-47 rifles, and other sidearms, the more interesting aspect of his confession was what he called "la guerra." The former Zeta stated that at the conclusion of training, his commanders sent the cohort to Nayarit, where Los Zetas are pushing into El Chapo territory.

A quick scan of Mexican media reveals some Zeta activity in Nayarit, though nothing that appears more volatile than Nuevo Leon or Tamaulipas, where the group continues to play tug-o-war with the Gulf Cartel. Rarely does media accurately cover the whole truth about criminal tactics in Mexcio, but it's interesting that Los Zetas may be training scores of men to throw to the fight in Nayarit. Survivors, the trainee said, return to Veracruz, where they then receive an assignment to work in another - presumably more peaceful - plaza in Mexico. Talk about trial by fire.

It was announced on 29 August 2011 that President Hugo Chavez will undergo a third round of chemotherapy following the removal of a cancerous tumour in June. Since his condition was made public, followed by extensive time spent receiving treatment in Cuba, speculation regarding Venezuela’s future has been rife.

The key considerations for coming 6 months are as follows:

1. Will Chavez be fit enough to complete his current term in office and lead his party, El Partido Socialista Unida de Venezuela (PSUV) until the December 2012 elections? Although his precise medical condition is unknown, and has been closely guarded, Chavez has obviously been physically weakened. Despite his public assurances that he will overcome the cancer, aggressive post-operative treatment continues.
2. Even if Chavez does recover and over the next six months appears capable of completing his current term, uncertainty remains as to whether he will have the political and physical might required to re-contest the presidency in 18 months’ time.
3. If Chavez cannot re-contest, the obvious question is who else could assume his role within the PSUV, as leader of the Bolivarian revolution? The two most likely candidates are his brother Adan, and former military colleague Diosdado Cabello. However both lack the political experience, public recognition and charismatic appeal of Chavez.
4. It is plausible that the uncertainty of Chavez’s and the PSUV’s future open the door to the main opposition coalition, the Mesa de la Unidad Democrática (MUD) to secure victory in December 2012. Even prior to his illness, Chavez and the PSUV faced increasing pressure from MUD who made gains in both the 2008 state elections and the 2010 national elections. These gains were made as a consequence of Venezuela’s continued energy shortages, ongoing social divisions, rising crime (Caracas is now one of the most dangerous cities in the World) and high levels of inflation.
5. Conversely however, MUD’s decision to defer the election of its presidential candidate until February 2012 means that the party currently lacks the political cohesion to demonstrate a real alternative to the PSUV. Furthermore, the two front runners for the MUD leadership, Henrique Capriles Radonski and Leopoldo López, have both faced legal proceedings in relation to corruption and political violence and neither have yet presented a clear political alternative to the PSUV. 
6. In terms of the implications on foreign investment in Venezuela, Chavez is likely to continue with his strategies of excessive spending (on 2 September he promised pay increases to members of the armed forces) and increased nationalisation of sectors such as gold, which are likely unsettle investors at least until the 2012 elections. However as the opposition has suggested, these are temporary measures that distort a weak and unstable economy and an eventual change of regime in Venezuela could lead to a significant increase in foreign investment.

A change in regime, precipitated by Chavez’s medical condition, could certainly lead to both economic and political advancement in Venezuela. However the uncertainty both within the PSUV and the opposition, combined with Chavez’s last ditch economic measures to secure re-election as long as his health will allow it, mean that in the short term we are likely to see significant instability in the political, economic and security environments.