It is within this context, that the legacy of chavismo will outlive the man, that we present this preliminary report on the Venezuelan elections. Our abbreviated addition to the substantial body of analysis that already exists in the public space on the elections and the future of Venezuela is the beginning of a series of in-depth reports we will present in 2013. These reports, as planned, will dig deep into what we consider the four cornerstones of chavismo: politics, society, the military, and PDVSA. Each topic arena, independent of the country’s next leader, will remain subject to the political inertia established and accelerated during President Chavez’s time in office, long after the elections.

In those 13 years and elections, the Chavez administration has been accused of fraud multiple times, won every presidential election, survived a recall referendum, deemed fraudulent by at least 7 scientific peer-reviewed statistical studies, and won a majority in every National Assembly election since 1999: albeit not maintained a two-thirds majority—and won all but one of the six referendums.

Furthermore, in the case of the lost referendum, Chavez subsequently pressured the Legislative Assembly to grant him the power to decree laws through an Enabling Act, Ley Habilitante—which he then used to enact several of the changes that had been proposed in the rejected referendum. Likewise, in the last elections for the National Assembly in 2010, Chavez’s party received a disproportionally larger number of seats despite receiving almost the same amount of votes as the opposition. This was thanks to a change in electoral laws benefiting Chavez’s party—especially through creative redistricting of first-past-the-post seats.

The difficulty for Capriles Radonski is that he cannot just win by a narrow margin. While the voting system in Venezuela is strong enough to prevent fraud on a massive scale, the Chavez government is still able to shave away 3-5 points, if necessary, thanks to its full control over the CNE, his ability to use government funds to mobilize supporters to the polls, and other dirty tricks. This gives Chavez an advantage over what may otherwise be a near even race. Therefore, if the race is tight, as we suspect it will be, localized small-scale fraud would be difficult to detect and would have a large impact.

1. The top-tier transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) are the primary drivers behind violence in Mexico in 2012;
2. The Mexican government will not significantly alter its current strategy in 2012 or beyond, into the next administration;
3. TCOs in Mexico are in constant communication with leadership elements of street gangs;
4. TCOs do not solely rely on drug trafficking as a source of illicit revenue; and,
5. The line between TCOs and street gangs is so blurred that many in Mexico still consider the two to be one single unit of criminality.

The Zetas Cross Theory, presented via our blog (see map) on 19 September 2011, is an internal discussion we use to frame a high-level understanding of the drivers behind the current violence in Mexico - largely perpetuated by three groups, Los Zetas, the Sinaloa Federation, and the Mexican government. After two months of field work and extensive interviews with sources across Mexico, we present today the December 2011 update.

Via the north-south line, which stretches from Nuevo Laredo through Zacatecas to Manzanillo, Colima, the city of Monterrey throbs as an important asset. After a week-long series of interviews on the ground there, information from various sources indicated that Los Zetas operators are still active in the city but at a significantly reduced level compared to late 2009. Though it is unclear if Los Zetas remain at a disadvantage due to the work of the Gulf Cartel and their allies, or due to the increased presence of the Mexican federal government in municipalities such as Guadalupe and Apodaca, their extortion and drug trafficking activities in the city have likely been displaced, promoting the cities of Saltillo and Monclova - also along the north-south Zetas Cross axis - as more important assets to the organization. Any forced entry into these cities by rivals or the government would likely be met with strong resistance. A separate but related increase in anonymous tips in Monterrey, if sustained, will government efforts to track and dismantled Los Zetas cells in the greater Monterrey metropolitan municipalities of Monterrey, Apodaca, and Guadalupe further complicating the targeted organization’s operations in Monterrey.

In a separate report (see Why Guadalajara is the next hotspot, part II), we will discuss our thoughts on the Los Zetas strategy for Jalisco, though within the Zetas Cross theory, this city and state remain a highly placed goal for capture within the organization.

Broadening from the fight on the Zacatecas-Jalisco border, the region encompassed by the states of Nayarit, Jalisco, and Colima will all likely see sustained high levels of violence as Los Zetas continue to probe for weaknesses within the Sinaloa Federation’s backyard - though not necessarily in the cities. Their push for this area of Mexico and the potential gain in a Pacific port and a piece of the methamphetamine trade will continue to drive a gradual shift of violence south from the border states into the Pacific-West region of the country - though the states of Chihuahua, Nuevo Leon, and Tamaulipas do not present signs of significant cooling.

As mentioned above, Los Zetas operational capabilities have been severely diminished over the past two years during the “War in the North,” conflict, initiated in January 2010 in the state of Tamaulipas where Los Zetas took on the United Cartels - Sinaloa Federation, Gulf Cartel, and the Familia Michoacana. While Los Zetas have weathered losses that would have crippled other groups, the organization’s command and control structure remains fractured; communications are strained after a string of busts that have dismantled their networks in northern Veracruz and across northeastern Mexico (see El Universal graphic here), and training is less likely a top-down organized affair than a city-level or local-level rush job managed by mid-level leaders in an attempt to keep guns in the hands of warm bodies. The net result produces young, poorly trained individuals thrown at Los Zetas’ enemies as a form of constant harassment and a deadly process of on the job training. Survivors rise quickly in rank but are lucky to make it past the level of a small plaza boss.

While the organization is able to keep the pressure on its enemies, Los Zetas' current lack of operational capability translates into a focus on softer targets; though the organization’s strategic vision, likely led by Heriberto Lazcano, appears to make up for tactical sloppiness. In Jalisco, this combination of superior strategy and below-average tactics will translate into attacks in and around smaller cities along Federal Highway 54, which connects the cities of Zacatecas and Guadalajara. In Colima, smaller cities along Federal Highway 200, outside of Manzanillo, or along Federal Highway 110, which connects Manzanillo with the city of Colima could become targets. In Nayarit, we’ve seen some of the country’s most brutal acts of violence in Tepic, though the fight for control of this state will likely play out more like an afterthought than a central strategy compared to the importance of Jalisco and Colima.

Meanwhile, the east-west line of the Zetas Cross theory, which stretches from Durango east by southeast to Tampico has remained mostly quiet. The Zetas continue to hold the line at the Coahuila-Durango border, in the twin cities of Torreon-Gomez Palacio, though it is unlikely that the organization has the strength to push deeper into Durango in a “clear and hold” fashion. Nor is the group likely to push north from Zacatecas into Durango. We plan on revisiting
this particular piece of the theory in late January 2012 during the next field trip to Coahuila and Durango.

The loss of a mid-level boss in Zacatecas and a possibly higher-ranking plaza boss, “El Comandante Aleman,” in San Luis Potosí weakens the Zacatecas-Tampico link, though there is so far little indication that Los Zetas have lost any control over this trafficking corridor. Nor is there an indication, however, that Los Zetas have made a significant push north from Veracruz into Tamaulipas. If that happens, violence in Tampico could serve as an early warning sign.